Sudan has vast oil, gold and agricultural resources. Who controls them?

Sudan’s three‑year civil war between the army (Sudanese Armed Forces) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces has produced the world’s largest displacement crisis (>9.5m people) and reconfigured control over the country’s key revenue assets—oil, gold and agricultural land—with the army holding much of the north, Khartoum and Port Sudan while the RSF dominates Darfur and many southern oilfields and central/southwest goldfields. Economically, Sudan’s 2023 exports totaled about $5.09bn led by crude oil ($1.13bn, output down to ~70,000 bpd in 2023; reserves ~1.25bn barrels) and gold ($1.03bn), with gold production reportedly rising to 64 tonnes in 2024 (~$1.57bn legal export revenue) and the UAE the dominant buyer; roughly 80% of exports flow to Asia and a handful of partners account for most trade. Control of refineries, pipelines and largely unregulated artisanal gold mining has become a critical funding mechanism for both sides, sustaining the conflict, disrupting agricultural production (notably the Nile/ Gezira croplands and gum‑arabic belt) and concentrating commodity export routes—factors that heighten supply‑chain, revenue and geopolitical risk for investors with exposure to Sudanese oil, gold and agricultural markets.

Analysis

Sudan's three-year conflict between the army and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has produced the world's largest displacement crisis—more than 9.5 million people—and a fragmented control map where the army holds much of the north, Khartoum and Port Sudan while the RSF dominates Darfur and many southern oilfields and central/southwest goldfields; RSF capture of el-Fasher on Oct. 26 underscores territorial shifts. Economic flows are materially impaired: 2023 exports totaled $5.09bn led by crude oil ($1.13bn) and gold ($1.03bn), with oil output down to ~70,000 bpd in 2023 (reserves ~1.25 billion barrels) and the Khartoum refinery (100,000 bpd) under SAF control as of late Jan 2025. Gold has become a pivotal revenue source—reported production rose to 64 tonnes in 2024 (up 53% vs 2022), generating $1.57bn in legal export revenue while the UAE bought >99% of 2023 gold exports—yet much extraction is artisanal and largely unregulated, sustaining a parallel black market. Concentrated trade links (80% of exports to Asia; top partners include UAE, China, Saudi Arabia and Malaysia) plus split control of pipelines, refineries and export terminals raise acute supply‑chain, revenue and geopolitical risks for commodity exposures tied to Sudan.

Key Decisions for Investors

• Reduce or avoid direct exposure to Sudan-linked oil assets and supply‑chain sensitive energy positions given output collapse to ~70,000 bpd, split control of southern fields by RSF, and strategic refinery/pipeline control by SAF
• Consider tactical allocation to liquid gold exposure (physical ETFs) as a hedge because legal gold exports and production rose sharply to 64 tonnes in 2024 and UAE demand concentrates flows, but size positions with active monitoring of sanctions and trade disruptions
• Avoid concentrated bets on Sudanese agricultural export supply chains (sesame, gum arabic) until security around Nile/Gezira croplands, Port Sudan and Bashayer export routes is demonstrably stabilized
• Monitor near‑term indicators—territorial changes, control of el‑Obeid–Port Sudan pipeline, status of Khartoum/Port Sudan refineries, and UAE gold import reporting—to reassess risk appetite and time hedges or re-entry