The nations doing deals with Iran to get ships through Strait of Hormuz

Commodity traffic through the Strait of Hormuz collapsed by ~95% after the conflict (from ~100 daily transits to single digits), leaving roughly 670 commodity vessels stranded and large exposures for Greek (≈75), Chinese (≈74), Japanese (≈23) and Indian (≈24) firms. Iran has implemented a permissions-based, escorted corridor effectively turning the strait into a fee-paying toll booth for 'friendly' nations (China, Russia, India, Iraq, Pakistan and others), with reported passage payments up to ~$2m in at least one case and some settlements in yuan, though Tehran denies mandatory fees. The shift from international maritime norms to bilateral diplomacy presents a market-wide geopolitical shock likely to tighten oil/LNG supply, increase price volatility and compel short-term operational responses (flagging/re-registration, route changes) by shippers and energy traders.

Analysis

Treat the Strait disruption as a persistent cost shock to maritime energy logistics rather than a one-off chokepoint squeeze. Even a low-single-digit million dollar per-voyage charge, or equivalent insurance/escort premium, is economically meaningful: on VLCC-scale cargoes that translates into order-of-magnitude $0.5–$2.5/bbl upcharge to buyers, while smaller tankers face multiples of that number per barrel — a direct wedge into refining margins and delivered fuel prices in Asia.

Second-order effects will propagate into capital allocation decisions across the supply chain over months. Expect accelerated reflagging and temporary registrations (administrative arbitrage), a surge in short-term ship-charters and time-charter rates, and rising demand for floating storage as cargoes queue — a structural tailwind for modern tanker owners and freight-rate derivatives, and a persistent headwind for refiners and commodity traders who cannot secure long-term term supplies.

Regulatory and legal friction creates optionality for market participants: if Tehran codifies a fee regime, the premium becomes a recurring line item that can be underwritten (insurers/brokers capture recurring revenue) or socialized into longer-term supply contracts (state-backed buyers gaining preferential terms). Conversely, a diplomatic breakthrough or credible US naval protection would collapse these premia quickly, so positions must be sized for binary geopolitical outcomes over 1–6 months.

Key Decisions for Investors

• Long tanker equity exposure (Frontline plc - FRO, Euronav NV - EURN): buy shares or 3-month call spreads sized to 2-4% portfolio; target 30-60% upside if spot/time-charter rates rerate higher, stop-loss 25% on de-escalation. Timeframe: 1–3 months.
• Buy Brent 3-month call spread (e.g., buy 1x 3-month ATM call, sell 1x 20-30% OTM call) to hedge energy price upside without full premium cost; position sized as 1-2% notional of portfolio, asymmetric payoff if supply-cost shock persists. Timeframe: 1–3 months; downside: loss of premium if diplomatic resolution occurs.
• Long port/bunkering exposure in Gulf of Oman transit nodes (DP World - DPW.L or regionally listed port operators): buy for 6–12 months to capture diverted bunkering and transshipment volumes; expected moderate upside (20–40%) with low correlation to oil price moves, risk is rerouting normalization.
• Long reinsurance/broker exposure to capture elevated war-risk premium flows (Aon plc - AON or Marsh & McLennan - MMC): buy 6–12 month exposure, expect premium revenue rerating but monitor loss-provision headlines; downside risk if large-scale insured losses materialize from escalation.