In race to end China’s chokehold on critical minerals the U.S. needs all the friends it can get

U.S. policymakers and private developers are accelerating efforts to undermine China’s dominance of critical-minerals supply chains—China controls about 90% of rare-earths refining—through a mix of bilateral investment deals, government financing and project development with allied countries. President Trump has struck a $3 billion U.S.-Australia investment pact and a series of bilateral accords across Asia and with nations from Ukraine to Argentina, while the Ex-Im Bank and DFC have issued letters of interest for major projects (including a $900 million LOI for Cove Capital’s $1.1 billion Kazakh tungsten project and a $120 million LOI for Critical Metals’ Tanbreez rare-earths project), and the U.S. has taken equity in MP Materials and proposed floor-pricing mechanisms to counter Chinese dumping. Developers like Cove Capital are targeting former Soviet Central Asian deposits that benefit from historical geological data to accelerate capacity, but analysts warn success requires a sustained, coordinated “wartime”-style effort given the U.S. lack of shovel-ready projects and the risk of waning political focus.

Analysis

U.S. policy and private developers are accelerating efforts to counter China’s dominance in critical-minerals refining—China controls roughly 90% of rare-earths refining—through bilateral investment pacts, government-backed financing and targeted project development. The Trump administration struck a $3 billion U.S.-Australia investment pact and has layered deals across Asia and with countries from Ukraine to Argentina, while the Ex-Im Bank and DFC have issued letters of interest including a $900 million LOI for Cove Capital’s $1.1 billion Kazakh tungsten project and a $120 million LOI for Critical Metals’ Tanbreez rare-earth project.

Developers are prioritizing jurisdictions with existing geological data and lower greenfield risk: Cove Capital is advancing tungsten and rare-earth processing in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan leveraging Soviet-era exploration records, and Critical Metals now owns 92.5% of Tanbreez with a construction target by end-2026. The administration has also taken equity in MP Materials and is proposing floor-pricing mechanisms to blunt Chinese dumping that has historically deterred investment.

Key risks are political durability and project execution: Rystad Energy warns the U.S. lacks a pipeline of shovel-ready projects and success requires a sustained, coordinated multi-year effort, while price-dumping and shifting geopolitical priorities could undermine nascent projects and financing commitments.

Key Decisions for Investors

• Prefer selective exposure to companies with explicit U.S. government support or LOIs (for example MP Materials and Critical Metals) while verifying conversion of LOIs into final loans or equity commitments
• De-emphasize high-risk U.S. greenfield developers absent secured offtake or financing and consider privileged exposure to projects in central Asia only after due diligence on permitting and project finance
• Monitor concrete milestones as primary catalysts: final Ex-Im/DFC approvals, construction start dates (Tanbreez target end-2026) and any announced floor-pricing mechanisms, and use those events to scale positions
• Protect exposure to the sector from policy or price shocks by small position sizing, hedges or options given the risk of Chinese dumping and potential waning of political focus