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Macerich (MAC) Q1 2026 Earnings Transcript

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Macerich reported Q1 FFO as adjusted of $0.34 per share and go-forward portfolio NOI growth of 1.2%, while reaffirming at least 3% NOI growth for 2026 and a $1.81 midpoint for 2028 FFO guidance. Leasing momentum remained strong, with 1.6 million square feet signed in the quarter, 700,000 square feet of new deals, and the cumulative SNO pipeline reaching $116 million toward a $140 million target. The company also closed the $272 million Annapolis Mall acquisition, which it says is $0.04 accretive to 2028 FFO, and boosted liquidity to about $780 million after upsizing its revolver to $900 million.

Analysis

MAC’s setup is no longer a simple “mall recovery” trade; it is increasingly a capital-allocation arbitrage on scarcer quality retail boxes. The key second-order effect is that every anchor backfill and SNO conversion does not just add NOI — it de-risks the remaining lease-up schedule, improves lender perception, and raises the optionality value of the portfolio because stabilized, fully merchandised A-mall wings can be refinanced or sold at materially lower cap rates than the cash flow today implies. The market may be underappreciating how much of the upside is now front-loaded in financing, not just operations. Upsized revolver capacity, asset-level refinancings, and equity issued above $19 reduce near-term liquidity pressure enough to keep MAC from being a forced seller into 2026 maturities; that matters because forced-sale risk has been the main overhang on the equity multiple. If management keeps executing, the gap between reported FFO and 2028 earnings power should narrow over the next 2-3 quarters, which can re-rate the stock before the NOI actually shows up. The biggest tail risk is not demand, it’s timing: if SNO openings slip into 2027 while dispositions and debt work consume liquidity, the market will again focus on leverage rather than embedded growth. Another risk is that the “great retailer demand” narrative becomes self-selection — the best tenants may be concentrated in the highest-quality assets, leaving the marginal centers with slower rent growth and lower recovery. That would cap the pace of multiple expansion even if sales remain healthy. Contrarian read: consensus is probably still too anchored to MAC as a balance-sheet repair story, when it is starting to look like a quasi-development platform with scarce asset exposure. The incremental accretion from Annapolis is modest in isolation, but the strategic signal is larger: management is willing to add stabilized, high-quality NOI where it can finance cheaply and then use disposition proceeds to compound into higher-quality cash flow. That is a more durable end-state than a pure deleveraging trade, and it could justify a higher valuation than the current market is assigning.