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On thinning ice: After almost four years of war, Russia’s central bankers are running out of tricks to keep the economy afloat

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On thinning ice: After almost four years of war, Russia’s central bankers are running out of tricks to keep the economy afloat

Russia entered a clear economic downturn in 2025: inflation fell to below 6% from 9.52% at end‑2024 amid a tight monetary stance (monetary base broadly flat at ~27.9 trillion rubles while M2 was 123 trillion rubles as of Nov. 1, +13% YoY and multiplier rising to 4.58); the central bank maintained very high rates through the year before cutting the key rate to 16% on Dec. 19. The federal budget deteriorated materially — a reported 4.5 trillion ruble widening of the budget hole driven mostly by a 3.7 trillion revenue shortfall, oil & gas receipts fell (~8 trillion rubles Jan–Nov, ~22% YoY) as Urals averaged $58/bbl and the ruble strengthened ~45% vs USD — while sweeping tax increases (PIT bracket reform, corporate tax to 25%, higher excises and VAT) boosted some collections but risk further depressing corporate profits and activity (corporate debt to banks ~84 trillion rubles, profits and output down across many civilian sectors).

Analysis

Market structure: High nominal rates and a static monetary base (broad base ~27.8–28.0T RUB) have produced winners—banks, insurers and government bond holders—via wider NIMs and mark-to-market gains, while exporters, manufacturers (auto, rail freight) and regional budgets are losers as a 45% ruble appreciation and falling oil receipts slash FX revenues and corporate profits. Domestic demand is contracting (M2 +5% YTD vs base flat; corporate loans to banks 84T RUB, +11% YoY), implying weaker pricing power for cyclical goods and stronger pricing power for state-backed defense/medical suppliers. Risk assessment: Tail risks include a December spending surge pushing the fiscal deficit to 3.6–4% of GDP (vs Finance Ministry 2.6%), triggering a ruble sell-off and corporate defaults; sanctions-driven FX illiquidity could amplify this. Timing: expect acute volatility around budget disclosure and early-2026 policy guidance (days–weeks), NIM and OFZ repricing over months, and structural GDP contraction over quarters–years. Hidden dependencies: bank profitability depends on continued low deposit pass-through and a non-frozen, but illiquid, reserve backdrop; tax hikes can erode the tax base, creating a negative feedback loop. Trade implications: Tactical long-duration OFZ and short-dated sovereign positions can capture expected rate repricing if the Bank of Russia pauses cuts; selective long exposure to Sberbank (SBER.ME) and TCS (TCSG.ME) captures NIM tailwinds while shorting autos/rail and large oil caps (e.g., LKOH.ME, GAZP.ME) hedges exporter FX pain. Options: buy RUB put/USD call 3–6m as insurance and use put spreads on bank longs to limit drawdowns. Monitor: December budget outturn, OFZ yield moves, and corporate NPL acceleration. Contrarian angle: Consensus underestimates the persistence of fiscal stress—tax hikes already doubled personal income tax take but threaten profitability; if December deficit stays <=2.6% and oil stabilizes (Urals >$65) the market has over-sold banks and OFZs. Historical parallel: 2015–16 post-sanctions tightening saw a rebound in local rates and bank earnings before a delayed productivity slump; unintended consequence—aggressive taxation may accelerate bankruptcies and further compress taxable base, producing asymmetric downside for cyclicals rather than for financials.