How many cargo ships are passing Hormuz strait?

Only 105 vessel crossings were recorded through the Strait of Hormuz from March 1–18 versus a typical ~120 daily transits, a decline of more than 95%. Sixty of those crossings were oil and gas tankers (nearly 60% loaded), with 47% of those tankers under sanctions and 17 vessels sailing Iranian-flag; about a third of all transits (35 ships) were under US/EU/UK sanctions. JPMorgan data show observable oil traffic averaged ~1.3 million barrels/day in early March (98% of that Iranian), with China receiving just over 1 million bpd versus ~5 million pre-war, risking major disruption to the ~20% of global oil/LNG that normally transits the strait.

Analysis

The immediate market impact is concentrated in maritime logistics rather than crude fundamentals: longer voyage distances and forced reroutes are multiplying effective tanker days and raising utilization for owners of large crude carriers. That mechanically amplifies cashflow for spot-rate exposed owners while simultaneously compressing throughput for short-haul refiners and container networks that cannot economically re-route, creating a divergence between asset owners with time-charter optionality and operating companies tied to fixed inland logistics.

Sanctions friction and elevated war-risk premiums are generating an opaque arbitrage layer — intermediaries that facilitate exfiltration of sanctioned barrels (brokers, ship-to-ship operators, non-Western insurers) are accruing value but also concentration risk of secondary sanctions. Insurers and reinsurers have pricing power in the near term; however, political or military de-escalation would unwind those premiums quickly, producing sharp P&L reversals for those whose earnings are tied to transient risk spreads rather than structural market share gains.

Viewed through a multi-horizon lens, the tail outcomes matter: days-to-weeks govern freight-rate spikes and options gamma; months govern refinery feedstock mixes, inventory builds, and Chinese buying patterns; years govern capex decisions on pipelines, alternative corridors and ship acquisition. Active positioning should therefore separate short-duration tactical exposures (rates volatility, war-risk premiums) from longer-duration strategic exposures (fleets, refiner margin shifts, sanction-enabling intermediaries) and include explicit trigger-based exit rules tied to corridor reopening or diplomatic settlements.

Key Decisions for Investors

• Long DHT Holdings (DHT) shares with a 3-6 month horizon: favored exposure to VLCC/large crude tanker spot upside. Position size = tactical (max 1-2% portfolio). Set a hard 20% stop and take-profit at 80-100% if TC rates remain elevated; rationale = convex cashflow to days-at-sea expansion, risk = rapid corridor reopening or time-charter roll-offs.
• Buy a 3-month Brent call-spread via BNO (e.g., buy ATM call, sell a higher strike) to express a capped upside on crude volatility without directional outright long. Cost-limited, high gamma if conflict persists; exit on confirmed diplomatic de-escalation or Brent break below pre-crisis lows to limit premium decay.
• Pair trade: long spot-rate exposed tanker owner (DHT or STNG) and short a container/air freight equity (ZIM or FDX) for 3 months. This captures divergence between increased crude voyage demand and collapsing container throughput. Keep pair delta-neutral at portfolio level; risk if global demand shock reverses both legs downward.
• Selective overweight in reinsurance/insurer names (e.g., Everest Re RE) for 3-9 months to capture elevated war-risk and marine premium repricing. Use tight stops and trim on political progress; downside risk includes claim shocks from escalation or reputational/secondary-sanction exposures to underwriters.