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Selling Bonds to Raise Cash! Global Central Banks Significantly Cut US Treasury Holdings, with the Scale of Holdings Dropping by $82 Billion in a Month

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Selling Bonds to Raise Cash! Global Central Banks Significantly Cut US Treasury Holdings, with the Scale of Holdings Dropping by $82 Billion in a Month

Foreign official custody of U.S. Treasuries at the New York Fed fell by $82 billion to $2.7 trillion since Feb 25 (lowest since 2012), with the Central Bank of Turkey alone selling about $22 billion in foreign government bonds. The Iran-related disruption and surge in oil prices has precipitated the fastest pace of official sales in over a decade, driving U.S. Treasury yields to their largest single-month rise in over a year and the biggest increases since 2024, raising borrowing costs and inflation risk. The episode is accelerating long-term reserve diversification away from dollar assets, forcing FX interventions and creating elevated market volatility and risk-off flows, especially among oil-importing emerging markets.

Analysis

Removing a consistent marginal buyer from the Treasury market has an outsized effect because modern market-making capacity is constrained: dealers and electronic intermediation typically absorb only a small fraction of large, concentrated official sales. Expect a material widening of term premium — on the order of ~20–40bp if the flow persists for 4–12 weeks — because private real-money holders are structurally less price-insensitive than sovereign buyers and will demand a premium for inventory. The immediate transmission to emerging markets is through two channels: FX reserve depletion forcing spot intervention, and higher global funding costs feeding through into EM local yields and sovereign CDS. A regime where commodity-driven FX shocks recur (oil up a material margin for 1+ months) should push EM policy makers to either tighten or sell reserves; either choice increases the likelihood of bank funding stress and sovereign spread widening of 50–150bp in the near term for higher-beta issuers. Reversal paths are discrete and time-limited: a diplomatic de‑escalation that compresses oil-risk premia can restore marginal buyer behavior within 2–8 weeks, while central bank liquidity measures (temporary repo, swap lines) can blunt term-premium moves but usually with lag. Over a multi-year horizon the structural trend — gradual reserve diversification away from any single sovereign asset — argues for a permanently higher compensation for duration risk, implying that the “floor” for long-duration Treasury valuations is lower than it was five years ago.