Back to News
Market Impact: 0.75

Trump touted bigger tax refunds, but higher gas prices are likely to eat them up

GS
Tax & TariffsFiscal Policy & BudgetEnergy Markets & PricesGeopolitics & WarInflationConsumer Demand & RetailEconomic DataAnalyst Insights
Trump touted bigger tax refunds, but higher gas prices are likely to eat them up

U.S. average gasoline hit $3.94 (up >$1 month-over-month) and could peak at $4.36 in May, which Neale Mahoney estimates would cost the average household about $740 this year — nearly matching the Tax Foundation's $748 estimated increase in tax refunds. IRS data show average refunds through March 6 at $3,676 (up $352 y/y), but Oxford Economics estimates higher gas prices could cost consumers ~$70B versus ~$60B in extra refunds and has cut its 2026 U.S. growth forecast to 1.9% from 2.5%.

Analysis

The key transmission we should focus on is marginal propensity to consume: an energy-driven margin squeeze redirects any temporary fiscal uplift into non-discretionary outlays for lower-income cohorts, materially lowering the fiscal multiplier of refunds. That reduces the elasticity of services and discretionary spending to fiscal impulses, meaning GDP effects from one-time refund flows will be front‑loaded and smaller than headline math implies. On the supply side, the most durable beneficiaries are middle‑and‑downstream energy nodes that can reprice or reroute flows within weeks — refiners and spot freight providers — while larger integrated producers face a much longer feedback loop because capex and export logistics adjust on multi‑quarter timelines. The knock‑on for retail and CPG is twofold: higher input and transport costs compress margins, and demand shifts toward lower‑margin essentials and discount channels, widening dispersion within retail sub‑sectors. Financially, expect consumer credit dynamics to diverge from aggregate consumption: card utilization and BNPL drawdowns will spike first, then delinquencies and securitized spread widening follow with a 3–12 month lag. That sequence creates a window where payment processors and hard‑goods lenders see nominal volume gains but rising loss provisions — a squeeze on regional banks and specialty lenders that are concentrated in consumer credit. Near-term catalysts that would reverse these strains are tactical — SPR releases, rapid diplomatic de‑escalation, or coordinated OPEC increases — which could compress spreads in 1–3 months. Structural reversals require a meaningful demand response (weak cyclical spending across multiple months) that would push the macro outlook from slowdown to recession risk over 3–12 months and alter Fed posture on rates.