Back to News
Market Impact: 0.85

Opinion | Why it's fair to blame Trump for rising gas prices

Geopolitics & WarEnergy Markets & PricesCommodities & Raw MaterialsTrade Policy & Supply ChainInflationElections & Domestic Politics
Opinion | Why it's fair to blame Trump for rising gas prices

The U.S./Israeli campaign against Iran triggered the largest oil supply disruption on record, pushing Brent to a brief high of $119.50/bbl and WTI to $119.48/bbl before settling around $86/bbl by Tuesday evening. Israeli strikes on ~30 Iranian fuel depots, tanker backlogs in the Strait of Hormuz and production cuts by Gulf neighbors drove the shock. U.S. retail gasoline averaged $3.54/gal on Tuesday, roughly $0.50/gal higher year-over-year, amplifying inflationary pressure and consumer cost burdens. Expect elevated oil-price volatility and risk-off positioning across energy-exposed assets and related supply-chain chokepoints.

Analysis

Price moves driven by sudden Middle East escalation are amplifying existing structural tightness in seaborne crude logistics rather than creating a new long-term supply deficit; the immediate second-order winners are those that capture transport and refining margin dislocations (tankers, storage/terminals, Gulf Coast complex refiners), while inland refiners and oil-intensive industrials will see compressed margins through disrupted feedstock flows. Insurance and voyage-risk premia will spike in days-to-weeks, which mechanically raises time-charter equivalent (TCE) breakevens for owners and creates an asymmetric short-term earnings lever for publicly listed tanker names. Political noise is the key volatility multiplier — public claims of de-escalation from political principals can unwind a large chunk of the risk premium inside hours, but tangible physical actions (attacks on infrastructure, tankers being rerouted) create supply shocks that can persist for months because rerouting adds voyage days, charter costs and reduces available tonnage. Expect a bimodal path over 1–3 months: either rapid partial normalization via diplomatic/SPR responses or a drawn-out period of higher structural freight and insurance costs that lasts into next winter. A meaningful medium-term effect (6–24 months) is on capex signaling for both producers and shippers: persistent elevated oil and freight rates re-accelerate US shale restart economics and justify brownfield tanker conversions, while also tightening political incentives to release SPR or negotiate corridor safety — any of which would be a catalyst to compress the elevated risk premia. Finally, the electoral overlay increases the chance of pre-emptive policy interventions (targeted SPR sales, tactical waivers) around key political dates, creating clear calendar-driven liquidity windows for tactical exits.