Sudan’s civil war explodes into int'l scramble for riches, power | Daily Sabah

Sudan’s civil war between the regular army and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces, fighting since April 2023 and punctuated by the RSF’s October seizure of el‑Fasher, has killed tens of thousands and uprooted nearly 12 million people while edging the country toward famine; the conflict has been increasingly defined by an international scramble for Sudan’s gold, farmland and Red Sea coastline. Analysts and U.N. and satellite investigations point to regional patrons and supply lines—Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Türkiye aligned with the army while the UAE is accused of funding and logistically sustaining the RSF via cargo flights and Libyan intermediaries—while Russia, Türkiye and others have sought coastal footholds; gold exports (Sudan produced >80 tonnes prewar and exported ~$3bn in 2021) have slipped underground, with UAE imports of Sudanese gold reported up c.70% during the war. The result is a deeply internationalized proxy war—reinforced by drones and foreign mercenaries—that both finances and prolongs the fighting and raises strategic risks for Red Sea maritime routes, commodity flows and any investors or firms exposed to Sudanese agricultural and gold sectors.

Analysis

Fighting between Sudan's regular army and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) since April 2023 has escalated into a humanitarian and strategic crisis: the RSF's October seizure of el-Fasher marked a turning point in a conflict that has killed "tens of thousands" and uprooted nearly 12 million people, with the U.N. warning famine levels are approaching. The collapse of state control has allowed smuggling and parallel economies to flourish, and prewar gold production of more than 80 tonnes (≈$3bn exported in 2021) has largely shifted underground.

The war is heavily internationalized: analysts and U.N./satellite investigations link the army with backers including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Türkiye, while the RSF is being sustained by funds, weapons and logistics traced to the UAE; researchers report more than 200 cargo flights tied to the UAE to Libyan airfields since June and a 70% surge in UAE imports of Sudanese gold during the conflict. Emirati companies' prewar control of tens of thousands of hectares and external bids for Red Sea access by Russia and Türkiye make farmland and coastline central strategic prizes.

Commercial implications include disrupted commodity flows, a reputational and legal risk chain for buyers of Sudanese gold routed through Dubai (described by Swiss watchdogs as a hub for gold of dubious origin), and heightened vulnerability of Red Sea maritime corridors that carry up to 12% of global trade. The entry of foreign drones and mercenaries further raises the probability of protracted conflict, increasing the likelihood of sanctions, shipping disruptions, and commodity-price volatility that investors and counterparties should monitor closely.

Key Decisions for Investors

• Reduce or avoid direct exposure to Sudan-based assets and counterparties—particularly agriculture and gold concessions—until clear legal title, security and supply-chain transparency are restored
• Reassess supply-chain and shipping exposure through the Red Sea, increase war-risk insurance or consider rerouting logistics, and model higher freight and delay costs as a contingency
• Implement enhanced due diligence and pause unsecured purchases of Sudan-origin gold linked to Dubai intermediaries, requiring chain-of-custody certification given the reported 70% surge in UAE imports
• Monitor geopolitical indicators (UAE-Libya cargo flights, Haftar activity, RSF territorial gains, and sanction movements) as explicit triggers to tighten positions or deploy hedges
• Use tactical commodity hedges or shift allocation to more liquid safe-haven instruments to guard against near-term volatility in gold and agricultural commodity markets