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Opinion | Why 2 Gulf States Want Iran War To Continue - Even As They're Battered By It

NYT
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Opinion | Why 2 Gulf States Want Iran War To Continue - Even As They're Battered By It

4,391 Iranian drone and missile attacks (about 83% of total) have struck GCC states, with the UAE hit ~2,156 times and Saudi Arabia ~723 times (two fatalities), severely disrupting Gulf energy and port infrastructure. Attacks and threats to the Strait of Hormuz and Bab-el-Mandeb are curtailing oil, gas and petrochemical exports, causing multi‑million dollar losses and reputational damage to Gulf financial hubs. The piece warns that waning U.S. commitment and a protracted conflict could force Gulf states to face an angrier Iran alone, heightening systemic risk to global energy markets and shipping routes.

Analysis

Gulf instability amplifies frictional costs across global trade infrastructure in ways markets underprice: shipping reroutes, longer voyage times and emergent war-risk premiums are a multi-month tax on container and tanker throughput that compresses netbacks for end-users while fattening intermediaries (brokers, insurers, re-shippers). Expect charter rates and war-risk surcharges to remain elevated until either a durable diplomatic architecture is visible or market participants build redundant capacity; both outcomes take quarters, not days, to materialize. Defense and security-capex demand is a structural second-order winner — not just immediate weapons sales but a multi-year expansion in coastal and critical-infrastructure hardening, private security, and cyber/ISR procurement that benefits large primes and specialist integrators with export capacity. Conversely, GCC financial services, tourism-facing assets, and locally concentrated sovereign-credit risk are the underappreciated losers: fiscal buffers will be eroded by higher security outlays and disrupted trade flows, pressuring issuance spreads and bank NPL sensitivity over 12–24 months. Catalysts to watch that would re-rate positions quickly: a China- or Pakistan-led backchannel that credibly guarantees Red Sea transit, coordinated SPR releases by consuming nations, or a tranche of GCC bilateral defense pacts that shifts risk away from Western suppliers. The primary tail risk is regional escalation into wider maritime blockades or retaliatory strikes on major export infrastructure — a scenario that would spike insurance costs, BDI/TC indices, and oil volatility within days and sustain them for months.