Israel’s 2005 Gaza disengagement, widely perceived as a failed peace bid that enabled Hamas and led to the Oct 7 attacks, is reinterpreted as a 'catastrophically successful' strategy by then-PM Ariel Sharon to freeze the peace process and avoid a two-state solution. This approach, which consolidated West Bank control and was inadvertently aided by U.S. concessions, was later continued by Benjamin Netanyahu to maintain a diplomatic impasse. The article argues this long-term strategy of conflict management ultimately proved unsustainable, culminating in the Oct 7 events and underscoring the inherent instability of indefinitely postponing a political resolution.
The provided analysis posits that Israel's 2005 Gaza disengagement was not a failed peace overture but a strategically successful policy by then-Prime Minister Ariel Sharon to indefinitely freeze the peace process. This move was designed to preempt international pressure for a two-state solution and consolidate control over the West Bank, a strategy his advisor Dov Weisglass described as putting the political process in "formaldehyde." The policy was inadvertently reinforced by the U.S. Bush administration, which granted significant political concessions for a minimal withdrawal. The article argues that this strategy of 'conflict management' was later perpetuated by Benjamin Netanyahu, who, according to a 2019 quote, viewed strengthening Hamas as a tool to prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state. The October 7, 2023 attacks are therefore framed as the catastrophic failure of this long-term strategy, shattering the assumption that the conflict could be managed indefinitely and leading to a political climate where Israeli support for a Palestinian state is at a record low, suggesting a higher probability of prolonged regional instability.
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