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Bab al-Mandab strait: Iran’s Houthi allies enter the conflict, raising fears over key trade route

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Bab al-Mandab strait: Iran’s Houthi allies enter the conflict, raising fears over key trade route

Iran-aligned Houthis have entered the conflict and Tehran has threatened to disrupt the Bab al-Mandab Strait — a chokepoint that handles roughly 15% of global maritime trade by value — raising acute risk to oil/gas flows to Europe. Oil prices are already up more than 50% in the past month, and traffic through Bab al-Mandab has fallen about 50% from pre-2023 levels (from ~60–70 ships/day to roughly 30–35), forcing costly reroutes via the Cape of Good Hope and lengthening delivery times. A concurrent disruption of the Strait of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab would be a market-wide shock, likely driving higher energy prices, broad supply-chain dislocations for Asia-to-Europe trade, and elevated downside risks to regional food security and economies.

Analysis

European energy and shipping economics will reprice if transit via the southern Red Sea becomes intermittently costly: marginal voyage time for Gulf-to-Europe crude could rise by roughly one to two weeks if owners rout around the Cape, increasing voyage fuel and hire costs by a material percentage and creating a temporary convenience yield for barrels positioned in or near Europe. That dynamic steepens Brent vs WTI and increases the attractiveness of floating storage and tanker time-charter revenues; expect spot crude tanker TCEs to spike sharply on short notice even if throughput volumes only fall modestly. Supply-chain second-order effects are asymmetric: manufacturers with long, inventory-light supply chains face immediate lead‑time shocks and higher landed costs, pressuring European importers and raising near-term goods inflation; conversely, commodity suppliers and storage operators able to offer near-port inventory will capture outsized margins. Insurance and war-risk premia create a choke-point where higher per-voyage costs reduce sailing frequency — this changes the elasticity of maritime services and can force freight rates up by multiples before physical scarcity appears. Tail risk is a simultaneous multi‑strait disruption: if both southern Red Sea and Hormuz were impaired for months, the result is structural re‑routing and persistent Brent backwardation with inventory draws in Europe; that is a low-probability, high-impact scenario with multi-month to multi-quarter persistence. Reversal catalysts include a credible multinational naval security corridor, a rapid diplomatic settlement backed by major trade partners, or a sustained de-escalation that collapses war-risk spreads; each could erase most risk premia within weeks rather than months. Consensus is pricing headline risk rather than calibrated scenarios; market participants have already applied blunt hedges that may be inefficient. The more efficient trade is asymmetric option exposure plus selective equity exposure to asset-light owners of crude tankers and defense-equipment producers — not bare long oil — because short-lived disruptions amplify freight more than, and often before, crude fundamentals.