Airpower for the Post-Dominance World: Restoring US Air Superiority Through a New Combined Arms Approach

The Hudson Institute advocates for a fundamental redesign of the US Air Force, proposing a shift from platform supremacy to a three-part, combined-arms strategy to counter advanced adversaries like China and mitigate escalating costs. This new structure comprises a dispersed 'Edge Force' for close-in disruption, a long-range 'Pulse Force' for concentrated strikes from secure areas, and a traditional 'Core Force' that engages after initial defenses are degraded. Modeling indicates this phased approach significantly reduces US aircraft losses and enhances mission success in high-intensity conflicts, requiring a strategic reallocation of resources towards more cost-effective, uncrewed, and resilient capabilities to ensure future dominance and global relevance.

Analysis

A Hudson Institute policy memo posits that the U.S. Air Force (USAF) is fiscally and operationally ill-prepared for a high-intensity conflict with a peer adversary like the People's Republic of China (PRC), whose advancements in sensors, precision weapons, and resilient networks have eroded traditional U.S. dominance. The report argues that scaling the current force of costly, crewed aircraft is unsustainable due to rising acquisition, sustainment, and personnel costs. Instead, it proposes a fundamental redesign into a three-part structure: a distributed 'edge force' of small, mobile, and often uncrewed systems for close-in denial and disruption; a long-range 'pulse force' of bombers like the B-21 and B-52 using standoff munitions from secure locations; and a traditional 'core force' of tactical aircraft (TACAIR) that would engage only after initial threats are suppressed. Wargaming simulations cited in the report show this phased approach is decisively more effective, suggesting it could annihilate a 300-ship invasion fleet, whereas a traditional TACAIR-heavy response allowed 60% of the fleet to survive. This new model dramatically reduces projected U.S. aircraft losses, which in conventional scenarios were estimated at 200-500 aircraft, with nearly 90% destroyed on the ground. The proposal necessitates a significant resource shift, involving shrinking the core force to fund the expansion of edge and pulse capabilities, prioritizing 'affordable mass,' uncrewed systems, and resilient enablers like C5ISRT and hardened logistics over high-cost, survivable platforms for every mission.

Key Decisions for Investors

• Investors should re-evaluate portfolios to favor companies aligned with the proposed 'edge' and 'pulse' force concepts, particularly those specializing in uncrewed aerial systems (UAS), low-cost 'affordable mass' munitions, mobile ground-based launchers, and long-range strike platforms like the B-21 bomber.
• Monitor prime contractors heavily reliant on large-scale production and sustainment of traditional 'core' force tactical fighters, as the report explicitly recommends shrinking this segment to reallocate funds, posing a potential long-term headwind for these programs.
• Identify opportunities in enabling technologies, which are critical to all three proposed force elements, including space-based ISR and targeting, resilient command and control (C2) networks, AI-enabled data fusion, and solutions for base hardening and distributed logistics.
• Recognize that the proposed strategy prioritizes mission-effectiveness and asset preservation through phased employment, suggesting that future defense budgets may favor survivable, long-range systems and attritable platforms over high volumes of short-range, manned aircraft.