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Can China achieve AI supremacy? By Investing.com

UBS
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Can China achieve AI supremacy? By Investing.com

Key figures: the U.S. currently leads with ~35 zettaFLOPS of AI compute vs China’s ~5 zettaFLOPS (~15%), while China is adding >500 GW of generation annually and could match U.S. compute by 2035 with nearly $1 trillion of AI data-center capex (or exceed U.S. compute by >3x in an aggressive, power-constrained scenario). Major constraints include domestic AI chips operating at roughly 25% of U.S. efficiency today (potentially improving to >50% by 2035) and ongoing export controls/limited access to advanced manufacturing tools. Investment implication: firms exposed to large-scale power generation, data-center construction, battery storage and related infrastructure could be primary beneficiaries if energy proves the binding constraint on AI scale; semiconductor and advanced manufacturing chokepoints remain key downside risks.

Analysis

Treat the compute race as a capital-allocation story, not a pure semiconductor arms race. If energy and siting become the binding constraints on large-scale model training and inference, value will migrate toward whoever supplies low-cost, dispatchable megawatts, the transmission and storage capacity that makes that power usable, and the physical real estate that hosts racks — not only into GPU vendors. That re-routes profit pools into utilities, EPC contractors, battery-materials suppliers and data-center landlords, and creates durable annuities (landlord leases, power purchase agreements) that are less volatile than chip revenue cycles. Export controls and efficiency-led innovation are the primary asymmetric risks to this theme. A policy rollback or a step-function improvement in chip energy-efficiency (architecture or process) would sharply reduce the marginal value of incremental megawatts and favor pure-play silicon and software optimizers; conversely, grid bottlenecks, permitting delays, or higher-than-expected renewable integration costs would amplify the advantage of players already embedded in power delivery and storage. Watch cadence: policy/toolship announcements move prices in days-weeks, buildouts and merchant power contracts play out over quarters-years. Second-order winners will be niche industrials and services that have been under-rotated: transformer and switchgear manufacturers, short-duration storage integrators, and location arbitrage specialists that site compute where power curves are most favorable. The consensus equity trade remains concentrated in a handful of chip and cloud names; the underappreciated alpha is in the mid-cap infrastructure chain that captures persistent OPEX and CAPEX from scaling compute. For portfolio construction, prefer asymmetry: buy options on concentrated winners where upside is convex and use pairs to express the structural divergence between compute-hungry endpoints and constrained silicon incumbents. Size these exposures with explicit catalysts (permitting approvals, export-control updates, multi-year PPAs), and carry protective hedges for policy reversals and algorithmic efficiency shocks.