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'Nobody underwrote for that': Private credit faces a key test as higher rates squeeze borrowers

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'Nobody underwrote for that': Private credit faces a key test as higher rates squeeze borrowers

Private credit faces a new stress point as “higher-for-longer” rates persist: borrowers are still paying near-peak floating-rate coupons and the market is pricing hikes, not cuts. Core U.S. inflation excluding food/energy rose to 2.9% YoY in May (highest since Sep-2025), while Fed minutes under Kevin Warsh showed officials leaning toward a rate hike this year, raising the risk that restructurings—not just short-term fixes—become more common. Liquidity strain is already visible via payment-in-kind (PIK) rising to >10% of direct lending loans from 7% in late-2022, and lenders are tightening underwriting and widening spreads, with biggest pressure on highly levered, weak-pricing-power borrowers and parts of software.

Analysis

The market is starting to reprice private credit as a duration problem rather than a carry trade. The immediate winners from a higher base-rate regime are lenders with the most pricing power and the best workout infrastructure; the losers are retail-facing BDCs and sponsor-backed loans underwritten for easier refinancing, where extra coupons now mainly accelerate amendment cycles, PIK toggles, and covenant resets. That creates a second-order benefit for distressed-special-sits platforms and for the largest alternative managers that can buy stressed paper, provide rescue capital, and monetize complexity when smaller lenders are forced into extensions.

The key risk is not a single blowup but a slow migration from “problem” to “restructuring” over the next 1-3 quarters. The canaries are rising PIK share, lower dividend coverage at BDCs, and any guidance cuts tied to non-accruals or NAV marks; if those show up together, passive retail vehicles should de-rate faster than the underlying loans because investors will price dividend risk before realized losses. By contrast, if inflation cools and the Fed signals cuts again, the stress thesis reverses quickly because refinancing optionality reopens and amendment volumes normalize.

Contrarian view: consensus may be too focused on systemic contagion and not enough on dispersion. This looks more like a manager-selection and underwriting-quality event than a broad credit crisis, so the trade is relative value, not a blanket short on all private credit exposure. The best expression is to own the platforms that can capture dislocation while fading vehicles that rely on stable marks and steady distributions; the move becomes overdone if PIK and amendment data stabilize for two consecutive quarters.