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These Are All of the Stocks Greg Abel, Warren Buffett's Successor, Dumped in the First Quarter

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These Are All of the Stocks Greg Abel, Warren Buffett's Successor, Dumped in the First Quarter

Greg Abel’s first Berkshire Hathaway 13F shows a notable portfolio reset: 16 positions were fully sold, including Amazon, Visa, Mastercard, UnitedHealth, and several smaller holdings, while Berkshire added Delta Airlines, Macy’s, and tripled Alphabet. The filing indicates a more concentrated, high-conviction approach, with 29 non-Japan positions remaining and Buffett staples Apple, American Express, and Coca-Cola still the top three holdings. Despite the turnover, the overall portfolio retains a strong Buffett-style bias, especially in financial stocks.

Analysis

The portfolio reset is less about a wholesale change in philosophy and more about removing incremental, lower-conviction exposure so capital can be concentrated into a smaller set of balance-sheet compounding franchises. That matters because a concentrated Berkshire tends to amplify signaling power: when it exits payment networks, telecom, and health care names, the market reads it as a judgment on durability of moats and pricing power, which can pressure factor ownership and create a short-term air pocket in those shares. The most interesting second-order effect is on the financials complex. Keeping large strategic exposure to AXP while exiting MA and V suggests Berkshire is distinguishing closed-loop economics and customer engagement from pure toll-collection networks with higher duration sensitivity to interchange scrutiny and competition. If that interpretation spreads, it can widen relative performance between diversified card issuers and the more rate- and regulation-exposed network model over the next 3-6 months. Alphabet is the clearest beneficiary in the set: an increase there signals that large-cap AI monetization risk is being treated as underappreciated relative to cash-flow visibility. The contrarian point is that the sell-off names are not being sold because the businesses are broken; they are being sold because Berkshire likely sees better expected returns elsewhere, which means the drawdown may be more a re-rating of position quality than a fundamental deterioration. That limits downside follow-through unless another holder cohort starts de-risking as well. Near term, the biggest catalyst is not earnings but copycat positioning: if other value-oriented allocators interpret this as a go-slower on network and consumer-discretionary exposure, the pressure could persist for several weeks. Over 6-12 months, the real test is whether the exited names continue compounding cash flow; if they do, this will look like a timing decision rather than a thesis break, and the market may reverse the de-rating.