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Don't call time on dollar dominance just yet, say analysts as 'petroyuan' call sparks debate

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Don't call time on dollar dominance just yet, say analysts as 'petroyuan' call sparks debate

The U.S. dollar fell almost 10% through 2025 after earlier strength tied to the Iran war and then weakened again as peace hopes pressured crude and WTI prices. Deutsche Bank argues the conflict could accelerate erosion of petrodollar dominance, while Franklin Templeton calls that view overly simplistic and says the dollar remains supported by deep markets and institutional strength. The article frames the dollar as structurally challenged but still dominant, with reserve share down from over 70% in 1999 to just over 50% today.

Analysis

The market is still treating the dollar debate as binary when the real opportunity is in the path dependency: a temporary war bid can coexist with a multi-year erosion in reserve share. The key second-order effect is that geopolitical stress actually reinforces the dollar in the very short run because oil, funding, and collateral systems are still dollar-centric; that means any “de-dollarization” trade needs patience and should not be front-run on headlines alone. The near-term beneficiary is not an alternative reserve currency, but USD liquidity assets and U.S. energy-linked cash flows that absorb the risk premium. The more investable implication is that structural dollar weakness is now increasingly tied to U.S. policy credibility rather than external competition. If investors conclude the U.S. can no longer reliably underwrite global security or fiscal discipline, the first response is usually diversification into gold, select developed-market currencies, and short-duration non-U.S. sovereigns—not a wholesale migration into renminbi assets, which remains constrained by capital controls and shallow market plumbing. That keeps the de-dollarization thesis real, but slow; the false consensus risk is overestimating how fast reserve managers can move versus how quickly they can hedge. For WTI, the war premium looks like a tradable volatility spike rather than a durable regime shift unless shipping lanes or supply infrastructure are actually impaired. The setup favors fading crude strength on peace headlines while staying long optionality against escalation tail risk, because the distribution is skewed: downside in WTI can unwind quickly on diplomacy, but upside can gap if there is evidence of physical disruption. In FX, the better expression is to own dollar rallies as tactical hedges while maintaining a strategic bearish bias on the dollar versus reserve-adjacent alternatives over a 6-12 month horizon. Deutsche’s framing is directionally useful but too linear: petrodollar erosion, if it happens, will likely show up first in incremental invoicing behavior and reserve rotation, not a dramatic regime break. The consensus is missing that the dollar can lose share and still remain the marginal refuge in every crisis; that combination is bearish for long-dated dollar dominance claims, but not bearish enough to fade every risk-off rally. This is a slow grind story with violent countertrend squeezes.