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Exclusive-North American pension funds stick with private credit bets

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Exclusive-North American pension funds stick with private credit bets

CalSTRS ($402bn) remains committed to private credit and holds positions tied to Blue Owl even after Blue Owl limited withdrawals in two non-traded BDCs following record redemptions. Public pensions show material allocations (Kentucky systems ~20%; Arizona PSPRS ~17% targeting 20%; STRS Ohio targeting ~10% with ~$1.8bn NAV across 537 companies), signaling continued demand despite redemption stress, rising competition and lower returns. Pension chiefs describe cautious optimism but expect a sector 'shakeout' as underwriting standards and AI-driven credit risks are re-priced.

Analysis

Large, patient pools of capital reduce the probability of an immediate fire-sale in private credit but increase the durability of the asset class — that durability is a double-edged sword: it concentrates power with large allocators and sponsors who can demand better economics, leaving retail-facing BDC wrappers and fee-heavy managers exposed to fee compression and higher redemption sensitivity. Expect a multi-quarter rotation of capital away from open-ended or lightly structured retail vehicles into closed, institutional co-invest vehicles and balance-sheet lenders who can underwrite selectively and hold loans to maturity. The principal tail risks are a short-lived liquidity cascade (days–weeks) triggered by a public liquidity shock and a slower, structural re-pricing (months–18+ months) driven by higher loss experience on AI-exposed software credits or cyclical corporate stress. Catalysts to watch: a wave of SEC scrutiny or legislation reshaping redemption terms (weeks–months), quarterly NAV markdowns in public BDCs (next 1–2 quarters), and any Fed pivot — a meaningful cut would compress new-issue yields and narrow the window for distressed originations (3–12 months). Consensus is underweighting the value transfer to firms that can take loans onto their balance sheets and to servicers that monetize distressed assets; conversely, it overestimates the speed at which retail-facing BDCs can rebuild fundraising momentum. That creates asymmetric trade opportunities: take short-duration options against fee-dependent managers while harvesting carry in selectively priced BDC equity with strict underwriting covenants, and size trades to reflect high idiosyncratic dispersion across managers over the next 6–12 months.