At Senegal forum, Niger and Mali say neighbours sponsor terrorism

This is less about immediate battlefield economics than about the breakdown of the regional coordination architecture that makes counterinsurgency marginally effective. When neighboring states publicly accuse each other of sponsoring violence, cross-border intelligence sharing, airspace deconfliction, and extradition-style cooperation all degrade; that typically shows up first as higher convoy risk, then as a widening insurance/logistics premium on anything transiting the Sahel corridor. The market impact is not a single headline move, but a slow repricing of projects that depend on stable borders, predictable customs, and uninterrupted security escorts.

The bigger second-order effect is that the AES states are incentivized to deepen security ties with non-Western partners that come with bundled financing, equipment, and political conditionality. That can keep regimes afloat in the near term, but it usually raises procurement opacity and weakens maintenance quality, which is bad for infrastructure availability and defense readiness over a 12–24 month horizon. For EM investors, the key trade-off is that sovereign narrative risk rises while local-currency assets can initially look “cheap” just as capital controls and reputational risk intensify.

A contrarian read: the rhetoric may be stronger than the operational change. These regimes often benefit domestically from externalizing blame, and the real policy path may still be selective cooperation on trade corridors and border controls because all sides need the customs revenue. If that pragmatic layer holds, the selloff in anything exposed to the Sahel may be overdone; if it fails, the issue becomes a multi-quarter drag on regional growth and a catalyst for more coup- or sanction-driven volatility.