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Did the Iran War Kill Any Chance of a Fed Rate Cut This Year?

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Did the Iran War Kill Any Chance of a Fed Rate Cut This Year?

The Fed is expected to hold the Fed Funds Rate steady at 3.5%-3.75% on Wednesday, with CME FedWatch pricing a 100% probability of no change at the meeting and a 30% chance of at least one rate cut by year-end. Investors will focus on Powell’s commentary for clues on how the Iran war and higher energy prices are affecting the inflation/rate outlook, especially as the Strait of Hormuz remains a key risk. The meeting could meaningfully shift rate-cut expectations and market sentiment even if policy itself is unchanged.

Analysis

This setup is less about the headline hold and more about the distribution of outcomes embedded in forward guidance. The market has already priced a no-change decision, so the first-order move is likely small; the bigger opportunity is in rates vol, front-end curve shape, and sector rotation if Powell signals that energy-driven inflation is becoming a persistent policy constraint. That keeps the bar high for cuts over the next 1-2 meetings and argues against chasing duration-sensitive equities on hopes of a near-term pivot. The second-order winner is CME: if the market remains pinned between a steady-policy base case and uncertain year-end cuts, short-dated rate volatility stays elevated and futures/hedging activity should remain firm. NDAQ also benefits from the same uncertainty, but more indirectly through sustained trading activity and elevated options turnover; the cleaner trade is CME because it monetizes macro uncertainty more directly. By contrast, INTC and NVDA are only marginally exposed to the rate decision itself, but any hawkish nuance that lifts real yields could pressure long-duration multiples, especially for the AI complex where positioning is already crowded. The underappreciated risk is that the Fed’s reluctance to cut is not just about inflation, but about preserving optionality while geopolitical shocks remain unresolved. If the Strait of Hormuz stays a live risk, energy and food inflation can re-accelerate faster than core services cool, pushing the first viable cut further out than consensus expects. That creates a short-term asymmetry: macro-sensitive growth can gap down on a hawkish dot/press conference, while a dovish surprise would likely be less potent because the market still has to reprice the path of inflation first. The contrarian view is that the market may be underpricing how little a potential Warsh transition matters for 2025 policy. Even a more dovish chair cannot force cuts through a committee facing sticky energy prices and fragile inflation credibility, so the relevant variable is not personnel but the inflation impulse over the next 6-12 weeks. In other words, the risk is not a surprise cut cycle; it is a prolonged higher-for-longer regime with intermittent inflation shocks that keep the front end trapped.