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One of Greg Abel's Forever Holdings at Berkshire Hathaway Is Breaking Warren Buffett's Most Important Investing Rule

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One of Greg Abel's Forever Holdings at Berkshire Hathaway Is Breaking Warren Buffett's Most Important Investing Rule

The article says Greg Abel added Apple and Moody’s to Berkshire Hathaway’s indefinite holding list, but argues Apple is historically expensive at 33x trailing earnings versus 10-15x when Buffett began buying in 2016. Berkshire sold about 75% of its Apple stake, or 687.6 million shares, in the nine quarters before Buffett’s retirement. The piece is primarily valuation commentary on Apple and Berkshire’s post-Buffett investment approach rather than a fresh corporate catalyst.

Analysis

The key market signal is not that Berkshire still likes Apple, but that its ownership is becoming less essential to the conglomerate’s capital-allocation framework. When a top-down holder with zero liquidity pressure repeatedly trims a position despite massive buybacks at the issuer level, it usually means the marginal expected return has fallen below other uses of capital; that is a negative medium-term signal for the stock’s multiple, even if fundamentals remain stable. The second-order effect is on sentiment and passive demand. Apple has become a crowded “quality at any price” anchor in many portfolios, so any perception that Berkshire is no longer the marginal buyer removes a psychological floor. That matters more than the direct share count because Apple’s valuation is still defended by narrative breadth; if growth continues to lag, the stock can de-rate without needing an earnings miss. The contrarian view is that this may be more about Berkshire’s portfolio construction than Apple’s business quality. A mature megacap with enormous buybacks can still compound per-share earnings even if headline revenue is flat, and a lower growth regime can actually improve capital intensity and cash conversion. The problem is timing: over the next 3-12 months, the market is likely to focus on multiples, not long-run compounding, so any rally from AI enthusiasm is vulnerable unless it converts into visible revenue acceleration. For the rest of Berkshire’s named holdings, the signal is mildly supportive for moat-plus-capital-return names like KO, AXP, OXY, and MCO because they offer clearer valuation support and more visible cash-return mechanics. The real implication for competitors is that capital is likely to rotate away from expensive mega-cap technology exposure and toward high-quality financials/consumer staples if the market starts rewarding earnings durability over narrative optionality.