Burial site of Khamenei not yet determined, religious foundation says

The market is underpricing how quickly “managed instability” around Hormuz can become a latent supply-tax on seaborne energy and petrochemicals even without a full closure. The first-order effect is not just headline crude risk; it is a persistent increase in freight, war-risk insurance, and inventory precaution that disproportionately benefits non-Middle East supply chains with flexible export capacity and hurts import-dependent refiners in Asia and Turkey through wider delivered spreads.

Turkey’s lack of an active gas-extension process matters because it removes a stabilizing bridge for the region’s gas balance just as Europe and the Eastern Med are still highly sensitive to incremental LNG availability. Any gap in Iranian pipeline volumes will likely be replaced at higher marginal cost via LNG and Russian molecules, which supports LNG shipping, regas, and US export utilization while compressing the leverage of adjacent pipeline suppliers that rely on long-dated, destination-fixed contracts.

The domestic security clampdown and communications disruption are a second-order credit and operational risk, not just a human-rights story. Extended blackouts and arrests typically weaken local commerce, accelerate capital flight, and raise sovereign risk premia before they show up in price indices; that argues for stress in Iranian-linked trade finance, regional insurers, and any counterparty exposed to settlement friction.

Contrarian read: the immediate price response in oil may be less durable than positioning suggests if the ceasefire holds and shipping disruptions remain partial rather than physical. The cleaner trade is volatility, not directional beta — the event creates a skewed distribution where upside tails reprice faster than spot fundamentals, but a normalization headline could crush risk premiums within days.