Shipping traffic through Hormuz still largely halted

The market is still underpricing how quickly a maritime bottleneck can morph from an energy shock into a broader liquidity event. With most of the trapped cargo effectively “optioned” on a political decision, the first-order oil move is only part of the trade; the second-order effect is a spike in freight, war-risk insurance, and vessel detention costs that can reprice global delivered energy and petrochemical spreads even if outright Brent retraces. That favors asset-light shipping intermediaries and LNG/oil logistics assets with limited exposure to the actual passage risk, while punishing refiners, Asian importers, and industrial users that rely on just-in-time Gulf barrels.

The key catalyst window is days, not months: if passage remains curtailed for another week, prompt physical tightness starts showing up in time spreads and regional differentials before headline crude fully reflects it. That creates a cleaner setup in Brent/WTI spreads and product cracks than in flat price alone, because the immediate shortage is in seaborne optionality and prompt delivery, not necessarily in global barrels over a quarter. Conversely, any credible de-escalation that restores even partial convoy traffic would likely cause a fast unwind in freight and insurance more than in front-month crude, which argues for expressing the view with options or relative value rather than outright beta.

Consensus is likely too focused on the geopolitics headline and too little on inventory geography. If tankers inside the Gulf cannot clear, the rest of the world can look “well supplied” while key consuming regions still face a local squeeze; that often supports refining margins in non-Gulf hubs and hurts Gulf-linked downstream names disproportionately. The contrarian risk is that the market reaches for a maximalist supply-disruption narrative, but the more durable trade may be a temporary dislocation in logistics and spreads rather than a sustained super-spike in crude.