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Market Impact: 0.6

Discarded frying oil becomes kerosene: how 1 million tons of used fat are at the heart of an aviation fuel market that could attract more than US$1 trillion in investment, already fueling planes with up to 80% fewer emissions, and have triggered a global dispute

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Discarded frying oil becomes kerosene: how 1 million tons of used fat are at the heart of an aviation fuel market that could attract more than US$1 trillion in investment, already fueling planes with up to 80% fewer emissions, and have triggered a global dispute

Global SAF production reached ~1.0 million tonnes in 2024 (~0.3% of 300–350m t annual kerosene demand) and is projected at ~2.1m t for 2025 (still <1%), while EU mandates require 2% SAF by 2025, 6% by 2030 and 70% by 2050. Used cooking oil—81% of EU SAF feedstock in 2024—is supply-constrained: the US collected ~3.3bn lbs vs domestic biofuel consumption of 5.7bn lbs in 2024, China exported ~3.0m t in 2024 (≈43% to the US, ≈$1.2bn), and prices rose from ~$0.20/lb in 2020 to >$0.50/lb in 2024 (+~150%), triggering fraud risks and trade tensions (US threatened to suspend imports from China in Oct 2025). Impact: persistent feedstock scarcity, price volatility and policy actions are sector-moving—creating near-term headwinds for airlines and buyers but strategic opportunities for refineries (e.g., Neste ~1.5m t capacity with ~2.2m t planned expansions) and accelerating investment in alternative SAF technologies (Fischer–Tropsch, alcohol-to-jet, Power-to-Liquid).

Analysis

The immediate winners will be firms that control collection and preprocessing of low-cost lipid streams — ownership of the upstream logistics is now a scarce, transactable moat that can be monetized via long-term offtake contracts or spot arbitrage. Integrated refiners that can convert hydroprocessing units benefit from optionality, but their margins will bifurcate: those with secured feedstock or credit capture will widen EBITDA, while those buying spot feedstock will see margin erosion. Policy and trade interventions are the highest-probability near-term catalysts and also the biggest tail risks: tariff announcements or anti-dumping investigations can re-route flows within weeks and reprice regional spreads; exposure should be measured in days-to-weeks. Over 6–36 months, capex cycles to convert existing units and build dedicated SAF capacity will determine who actually captures incremental demand — early movers pay capex but secure higher long-term margins. A realistic upside path is driven by contract re-pricing and credit arbitrage rather than spot feedstock; companies that sell bundled fuel+credits to airlines will extract most value. The structural bear case is technological substitution — scalable e-fuels or FT routes — which would cap commodity-derived feedstock pricing but not eliminate short-to-medium-term scarcity rents. Contrarian view: the market prices a permanent feedstock shortage, but supply elasticity exists via expanded collection networks, substitution to non-food fats, and modest policy recalibration once fraud/traceability issues surface. That implies a mean-reversion trade where players with rapid, low-cost buildouts (logistics + modular hydrotreaters) re-rate faster than legacy incumbents burdened by large greenfield projects.