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The war in Iran could soon restart. This time it isn’t entirely Trump’s fault

Geopolitics & WarEnergy Markets & PricesInfrastructure & DefenseEmerging MarketsSanctions & Export Controls
The war in Iran could soon restart. This time it isn’t entirely Trump’s fault

The article warns that the Iran-Israel-U.S. conflict could restart, with the ceasefire from April 7 under strain and Iran still refusing a formal moratorium on uranium enrichment. It highlights the risk of renewed attacks on the Strait of Hormuz, which has already contributed to the greatest oil supply shock in history, and notes that drones struck a UAE nuclear power station on Sunday. A return to war would likely intensify volatility across energy markets, Gulf assets, and the broader world economy.

Analysis

The market is underpricing how quickly a “frozen” conflict can reprice as an energy-supply regime change rather than a headline risk. The key second-order effect is not just higher crude; it is a persistent widening in Gulf freight, insurance, and regional credit spreads because the Strait issue converts a one-time shock into a recurring toll on every barrel and cargo. That structure favors assets with explicit scarcity pricing power and hurts any EM balance sheet reliant on dollar funding, imported fuel, or uninterrupted Gulf logistics. The most important tell is that diplomatic failure now has convexity: a stalled negotiation can shift from low-volatility stalemate to kinetic escalation with little warning, and the market historically reprices Gulf conflict on days, not months. In that window, the biggest losers are refiners, airlines, chemicals, and Asian importers with no hedges; the biggest winners are upstream producers, US LNG/export infrastructure, and defense/ISR suppliers tied to munitions, drones, and air defense replenishment. A prolonged closure also tightens the effective oil market faster than headline inventories suggest, because shipping bottlenecks act like an invisible supply cut. The contrarian point is that consensus may be focusing too much on “oil up” and not enough on sanction intensity and regime cash flow. If the Strait remains partially constrained, local pricing power and illicit trade can improve for sanctioned intermediaries even as the broader economy weakens, which means some regional EM proxies can rally on volume arbitrage while the index-level picture deteriorates. Over 1-3 months, the more attractive expression is not a naked macro oil bet but a relative-value basket against transport, airlines, and consumer discretionary exposed to fuel.