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Market Impact: 0.78

IMF slashes growth forecast for Middle East as Gulf exporters reel from impact of war

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IMF slashes growth forecast for Middle East as Gulf exporters reel from impact of war

The IMF cut Middle East and North Africa real GDP growth to 1.1% for this year, down 2.8 percentage points from its January forecast, citing the impact of the Iran war on energy production, transport, and shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. Saudi Arabia’s 2026 growth forecast was lowered to 3.1% from a January estimate, while Iran is now expected to contract 6.1% before rebounding to 3.2% next year. The outlook is less severe for oil importers such as Egypt, but the conflict raises inflationary pressures and creates broad regional growth risks.

Analysis

The market is starting to price the conflict less as a pure energy-supply shock and more as a growth shock with a delayed inflation impulse. That matters because lower growth in the Gulf hits not just sovereign revenue but also capex cycles, project finance, port throughput, and imported-demand proxies across construction, telecom, and consumer sectors in the broader EM complex. The near-term beneficiary is inflation-sensitive duration: if oil stays below the psychologically important $100 level, it reduces the odds of a second-round inflation reacceleration and supports rate-cut expectations in DM and select EM importers. The underappreciated second-order effect is shipping dislocation, not crude alone. Even if headline oil eases, elevated insurance, rerouting, and inventory-holding costs can keep freight and refined-product spreads sticky for 1-3 quarters; that argues for a relative-value trade versus the outright energy beta. Countries with alternative export routes and deeper FX buffers should outperform peers whose fiscal math is most tied to Hormuz throughput, while importers with credible policy frameworks can gain via lower import bills and improved external balances. The biggest contrarian risk is that the market is treating this as transitory while infrastructure damage and blockade friction can create a longer supply-chain scar. If port access, pipeline integrity, or tanker availability remain impaired into summer, the eventual inflation impulse could reassert through diesel, aviation, and petrochemical feedstocks even if Brent remains rangebound. That would punish rate-sensitive assets that currently trade on a cleaner disinflation narrative. Consensus may also be underestimating dispersion within the region: oil-importing EMs with large subsidy burdens or FX fragility may get only modest relief because lower crude is offset by higher logistics costs and weaker remittances/tourism from the Gulf. This makes the setup more attractive for relative value than index-level risk-taking: the right expression is to fade fragile exporters and own beneficiaries of cheaper energy plus lower inflation expectations.