We would arrest Netanyahu, says Hungary's incoming PM

This is less about one arrest warrant and more about whether the ICC still has usable deterrence in Europe. If Hungary reverses course, it reduces the perception that EU states will selectively honor international legal obligations, which raises the political cost for other governments to quietly ignore ICC actions. The second-order effect is on diplomatic routing: heads of state, senior ministers, and security officials tied to contested theaters may face narrower travel options across the continent over the next 3-12 months.

The immediate winners are rule-of-law advocates and any European governments wanting to project institutional credibility; the immediate losers are leaders and intermediaries who rely on Europe as a low-friction venue for diplomacy, fundraising, and coalition-building. The more interesting trade-off is that stricter compliance can harden bloc politics by making certain negotiations less flexible, especially around ceasefire mediation and prisoner swaps, where neutral ground matters. That can slow dealmaking even as it improves legal consistency.

The market impact is modest in isolation, but the tail risk is reputational spillover into EU institutional cohesion. If this becomes a test case, it may increase friction between national sovereignty and supranational enforcement, which can leak into broader headlines around sanctions, judicial independence, and funding conditionality over the next quarter. A reversal back toward withdrawal would likely be read as a signal that domestic political theater still dominates legal commitments, reducing the probability of a broader enforcement regime and muting any follow-through.