The article argues that the yuan is gaining international use, with yuan transactions accounting for 30% of China’s external merchandise trade in 2024, up from 15% in 2020. It ties the currency shift to sanctions, China’s role as a top importer for many countries, and the Iran Strait of Hormuz disruption, where yuan and crypto have reportedly been used for illegal toll payments. The broader piece also highlights spillovers from the Iran war into energy prices, supply chains, and global FX positioning, implying market-wide geopolitical and currency implications.
The market underestimates how fast a sanctions-era settlement rail can become a commercial standard once it solves working-capital friction. The yuan’s real edge here is not reserve-currency status; it is that it shortens the payment chain for countries already buying Chinese goods, which reduces FX conversion costs, correspondent-bank dependency, and sanction visibility. That creates a self-reinforcing loop: more trade invoiced in RMB increases offshore liquidity, which further lowers transaction costs and widens usage beyond sanctioned counterparties. The second-order winner is not just China, but Chinese banks, payment infrastructure, commodity brokers, and logistics firms that sit inside the RMB settlement ecosystem. The loser set is broader than the dollar: any state or company that relies on USD-clearing for trade finance in higher-risk corridors faces gradual erosion of pricing power and fee income, especially in energy, shipping, and commodity intermediation. The strongest near-term beneficiaries are likely Hong Kong-based clearing nodes and Chinese policy banks, while the biggest medium-term risk to them is not geopolitics but capital account control if Beijing tightens the spigot to defend the currency. The contrarian read is that this is less a dollar-collapse story than a fragmentation story. The dollar remains dominant for savings and balance-sheet funding, but trade settlement can migrate much faster than reserve allocation; that means the first order effect is in cross-border payment volumes, not official reserves. If the Iran shock fades or sanctions enforcement tightens on RMB-linked trade, usage could stall quickly; but if energy importers in the Global South normalize RMB invoicing over the next 6-18 months, the market is likely still underpricing the persistence of this shift. From an assets standpoint, the cleanest expression is not a direct yuan long, but a relative trade favoring Chinese financial infrastructure and China-linked settlement ecosystems over U.S.-centric global payment franchises. The higher-volatility overlay is crypto: the article suggests it is being used as a bridge asset in sanctioned corridors, which could keep select on-chain payment rails bid, but also raises enforcement risk and headline-driven drawdowns.
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