Poland can ship oil for non-Russian shareholders of Schwedt refinery if asked

This is less about one refinery and more about Europe’s last-mile crude optionality: when a politically sensitive inland plant loses a sanctioned feedstock, the marginal barrel has to come from a more expensive, less liquid logistics chain. That tends to widen regional product cracks before it shows up in headline crude benchmarks, because the first-order issue is not supply scarcity but transport friction and contract reshuffling. The immediate winners are alternative seaborne suppliers and downstream carriers with rail/barge flexibility; the losers are the refinery margin pool and any local distributors reliant on steady inland throughput.

The second-order effect is on bargaining power. If Poland becomes a de facto swing logistics route for non-Russian owners, the asset’s commercial value becomes more dependent on bilateral politics than refinery economics, which raises the discount rate on future cash flows and makes maintenance/investment decisions more fragile. In the near term, that creates an incentive for opportunistic crude arbitrage into Northwest Europe, but over 1-3 months it also risks a temporary diesel/gasoline supply squeeze if the refinery cannot replace barrels at parity economics.

The contrarian angle is that this may be less bearish for German product markets than consensus assumes. If the plant idles or runs lighter, import demand shifts to seaborne refined products rather than crude, which can support margins at regional refiners and tanker rates even if the refinery itself is pressured. The bigger risk is policy reversal: any exemption, emergency routing, or sanctions workaround would compress the dislocation quickly, so the trade is likely a 2-8 week relative-value event rather than a multi-quarter macro call.