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Here's Why Oil Prices May Remain High Even If the Iran War Ends

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Here's Why Oil Prices May Remain High Even If the Iran War Ends

Brent crude is trading around $112/bbl, roughly +55% since the Iran war began, and U.S. national average gasoline prices are now over 30% higher than pre-war levels. Goldman Sachs warns oil-price risks are skewed to the upside near-term and into 2027 as Iranian strikes on Persian Gulf infrastructure (including an attack that removed ~17% of Qatar's LNG export capacity) and a global race to refill strategic reserves (IEA released 400M barrels) tighten supply. Morgan Stanley moved from estimating an 8M ton LNG surplus pre-war to expecting a ~15M ton deficit, underscoring multi-year supply disruption risks. Implication for portfolios: higher inflation and stagflation risk support a cautious, risk-off stance with potential upside for energy and commodity exposures and downside for cyclically sensitive assets.

Analysis

Damage to Gulf energy infrastructure plus an active global race to refill strategic stocks creates a two-part structural bid for oil: a leftward shift in effective supply (capacity offline, higher operating risk premiums) and a temporary mechanical increase in physical drawdowns as governments rebuild reserves. The refill dynamic is important because it turns a one-off production shock into months of incremental demand — policymakers will likely target multi-month purchase programs rather than single-day releases, so expect an elevated oil-demand backdrop for 3–18 months even if chokepoints reopen. Second-order demand emerges from fuel switching and logistics frictions. Regional LNG shortages will keep gas prices elevated, incentivizing switching toward oil-derived fuels in some power and industrial markets and adding an incremental 0.2–0.6 mb/d swing in oil-equivalent demand in tight months; longer shipping reroutes and higher tanker insurance will raise delivered crude costs and compress refining throughput in high-cost importers, supporting crude vs. product crack outperformance. Near-term reversals are feasible: a coordinated OPEC+ fill-in, rapid large-scale repairs, or diplomatic resolution that removes Iran’s incentive to target infrastructure could knock risk premia down in 1–3 months. Conversely, a campaign of low-cost drone strikes or protracted repair timelines (1–5 years for LNG terminals) keeps the higher baseline for years and increases the value of convex option exposures. Net: treat current strength as a regime shift toward higher volatility and persistent upside skew. Positioning should prefer liquid, convex exposures to higher oil and freight/insurance risk premia while hedging macro rate/inflation feedbacks that can compress risk assets if central banks respond aggressively.