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US duties have reached Germany: they work no worse than stopping Gazprom's supplies

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US duties have reached Germany: they work no worse than stopping Gazprom's supplies

US tariffs imposed after the US–EU deal (introduced in August) have pushed German exports to the United States down 7.8% in the first three quarters of 2025 year‑on‑year, with car and spare‑parts exports plunging 14% and equipment exports (including steel/aluminum‑related goods subject to 50% duties) falling 9.5%. A Cologne Institute for Economic Research study — funded by the German Foreign Ministry — finds cars, equipment and chemicals (together >40% of US‑bound exports) drove more than 5.2 percentage points of the decline (over two‑thirds of the total), slowed overall German export growth by 0.81%, and helped push global equipment exports down 3.3%, a development the authors characterize as a likely “new normal.”

Analysis

Market structure: US tariffs have reallocated demand away from German exporters (VWAGY, BMWYY, MBGYY, BASFY, SIEGY) and toward domestic/other foreign suppliers (F, GM, TM, MT). German pricing power in the US shrinks — the reported -14% car exports and -9.5% equipment suggest a 5–10% permanent volume shock to affected OEM/industrial revenue if tariffs remain at current levels into 2026. Commodities (steel/aluminium) face regional supply shuffling that supports prices for non-EU producers; EUR/USD is likely to trade 1–3% weaker vs. baseline over 6–12 months on export drag. Risk assessment: Tail risks include escalation to broader EU–US retaliation (high-impact, <10% probability) or an immediate tariff rollback (10–20% probability) that would sharply re-rate names; both would move valuations by >15% within weeks. Short-term (weeks–months): inventory destocking and rerouting; medium-term (6–18 months): capex and production migration (Mexico/US) reshape margins; long-term (2–4 years): permanent loss of US share for firms that don’t localize. Hidden dependencies include supplier contracts and local content thresholds that can blunt or accelerate revenue recovery. Trade implications: Direct plays favor shorting German OEM exporters and industrials while going long North American steel and certain US OEMs and battery/materials chains that benefit from onshoring (MT, ALB). Use 3–12 month option structures to express views: buy puts on VWAGY/BMWYY and call spreads on MT/X for convexity. Rotate weight out of European industrial ETFs into US auto and materials over the next 4–12 weeks ahead of Q4 2025 earnings. Contrarian angles: Consensus may underweight the speed of re-shoring — firms with US plants (BMW in Spartanburg; MBGYY footprint) will outperform peers, creating dispersion within the same sector. The sell-off likely over-penalizes suppliers with <20% US revenue where declines are already priced-in; look for selective entry points 6–12 months out as capex to relocate production becomes visible. Historical parallels (post-2002 steel tariffs) show short-term pain followed by supply-chain adaptation and new winners among domestic suppliers.