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Nuclear energy, Taiwan and Trump's 'Golden Dome': key points from the Xi-Putin talks

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Nuclear energy, Taiwan and Trump's 'Golden Dome': key points from the Xi-Putin talks

Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin signaled deeper China-Russia alignment but stopped short of finalizing the long-discussed Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline, leaving key pricing and timing issues unresolved. The joint declaration criticized Donald Trump's Golden Dome missile defense plan and warned against global domination, reinforcing geopolitical tensions. Russia also said it wants to power its GigaChat AI model with Chinese chips as Western sanctions continue to restrict access to advanced hardware.

Analysis

The near-term market takeaway is not that a pipeline was announced, but that the negotiating leverage around Eurasian gas is still unresolved. That matters because every month of delay preserves Russia’s discount-to-market pricing into China and keeps a meaningful share of the adjustment burden on upstream producers, Russian fiscal revenues, and alternative buyers of LNG who benefit from a less aggressive Siberian reallocation. The bigger second-order effect is on capital allocation: if Moscow cannot lock in long-dated Chinese offtake, sanctioned gas projects remain stranded-value candidates rather than rerating assets. For energy markets, the signal is asymmetric. A true Power of Siberia 2 breakthrough would be bearish for seaborne LNG and mildly bearish for regional gas hubs over a multi-year horizon, but the lack of a deal keeps that overhang deferred. In the meantime, China retains optionality to pressure spot LNG procurement and extract better terms from Qatar, Australia, and U.S. exporters, while Russia remains forced to monetize with a weaker bargaining chip and heavier dependence on China’s industrial demand cycle. The AI angle is more interesting than the headline suggests: if Russian firms want Chinese chips for domestic models, the bottleneck shifts from software ambition to hardware import channels and foundry-grade packaging, which increases sanctions leakage risk but also reinforces the premium on non-U.S. semiconductor supply chains. That supports a multi-quarter thesis that China’s chip ecosystem is increasingly strategic infrastructure, not just cyclicals, while Western export controls keep redistributing demand toward second-tier Asian suppliers and gray-market intermediaries. Contrarian view: the market may be underpricing the duration of strategic alignment even without a pipeline deal. The more Washington frames missile defense and bloc politics as zero-sum, the more Beijing and Moscow have incentive to deepen technical cooperation in energy, AI, and industrial inputs through incremental deals rather than one big headline agreement. That favors a grinding, option-like effect rather than an immediate catalyst: low probability of a near-term breakthrough, but rising cumulative pressure on Western energy and semiconductor policy.