Billionaire Bill Ackman Has 13% of Pershing Square Capital Management's $19 Billion Hedge Fund in 1 Stock That's 31% Below Its 52-Week High

Uber is Pershing Square's largest holding at 12.7% of its $19 billion portfolio after Ackman began accumulating shares in January 2025; the stock was 31% below its 52-week high as of Sept. 17. The article highlights Uber's 16.2x forward P/E and Pershing Square's estimate for 25% annual EPS growth over the next three to five years, suggesting a hypothetical 277% share-price gain by 2030 if the multiple reaches 20x. Autonomous vehicles remain the principal risk, but AV rides represent only 0.1% of global ride-hailing trips versus Uber's 297 million weekly trips last quarter.

Analysis

The investable question is whether autonomy erodes Uber's take rate or simply lowers the supply-side cost curve. In a fragmented AV market, Uber's demand aggregation, payments, routing and cross-sell can preserve platform economics while lower fares expand trip frequency; this is structurally more favorable to UBER than to fleet-owning AV operators, which bear utilization and depreciation risk. The adverse case is geographically concentrated but material: if Waymo or Tesla owns both rider demand and vehicle supply in the highest-density, highest-contribution cities, Uber could face local take-rate compression well before AV penetration becomes meaningful nationally.

Near term, the stock's rerating depends less on headline AV milestones than on proof that mobility and delivery contribution margins continue expanding while incentive intensity remains contained. Over the next 1-3 months, monitor management commentary on AV-partner economics, city launches, and whether gross-bookings growth converts into free cash flow after stock-based compensation; a forward earnings multiple is not compelling if per-share growth relies on adjusted-profit definitions or buybacks rather than durable operating leverage. Over 6-18 months, AV integration could become a catalyst if Uber demonstrates it can add autonomous supply without subsidizing rides or ceding customer ownership.

Consensus may be treating AV as binary disruption rather than a bargaining-power issue. Uber's downside is not zero-demand; it is a lower-margin marketplace outcome, whereas upside comes from becoming the neutral distribution layer for several AV fleets. That asymmetry supports ownership only if partnership disclosures show Uber retains customer data, pricing influence and a defensible commission structure.

Key Decisions for Investors

• Initiate a 6-12 month long UBER position on weakness, sized as a fundamentals-driven rerating trade rather than an AV call option. Target upside requires sustained per-share earnings and FCF growth consistent with mid-20% compounding; exit or reduce if next two quarterly reports show contribution-margin deterioration or a material increase in rider/driver incentives.
• Prefer a relative-value expression of long UBER / short LYFT over an outright ride-hailing basket for the next 3-6 months. Uber's broader demand ecosystem and international scale should better absorb AV integration costs; invalidate the spread if Lyft secures superior AV distribution terms or materially closes its adjusted EBITDA margin gap.
• Do not short TSLA or GOOG solely as a hedge to UBER: successful robotaxi commercialization can expand total ride-hailing demand and create supply for Uber. Instead, establish an alert around disclosed Uber AV partner take rates, exclusive-city arrangements, and any evidence that AV operators are acquiring riders directly at lower customer-acquisition cost.
• Before adding aggressively, reconcile consensus EPS with GAAP net income, diluted-share growth and free-cash-flow conversion. If stock-based compensation or dilution prevents per-share FCF from tracking reported EPS, the expected multiple expansion thesis is impaired even if bookings remain strong.