2 Turnaround Stocks Wall Street Hates That I've Been Buying in 2026

Goodyear, down 80% over the past decade and largely rated hold/underweight by analysts, is presented as a turnaround candidate as its Goodyear Forward program builds on $1.5 billion of run-rate cost savings; shares trade at roughly a 20% discount to tangible book value. Fiverr, down 97% from its peak and rated hold by all 10 covering analysts, is contending with AI-driven losses in lower-margin work, but $1,000+ project revenue rose 13% year over year and spend per buyer increased 15.6% to $368. Fiverr ended June with $308.5 million of cash and investments, no debt, and positive cash flow, with its market capitalization only about $24 million above its cash position.

Analysis

GT is a levered self-help equity rather than a clean EV beneficiary. The relevant rerating trigger is not tire-demand stabilization alone, but evidence that restructuring converts into sustained North American replacement-tire margin expansion and debt reduction; without that, lower-cost Asian imports can absorb industry price increases and prevent operating leverage from reaching equity holders. A weaker USD, tariff enforcement, or rubber/oil-cost relief would improve the 1-3 month setup, while OE production cuts or another freight/input-cost spike would expose the downside convexity embedded in GT’s capital structure.

FVRR screens as an asset-backed optionality situation, but the market is likely discounting a structurally shrinking marketplace rather than merely a cyclical slowdown. The critical variable is whether higher-value project growth can offset buyer attrition while preserving contribution margin after sales-and-marketing and stock-based compensation; gross marketplace volume, active-buyer trends, and take-rate are more informative than headline revenue. Over 6-18 months, AI could either commoditize its transaction layer or increase demand for human-led implementation, editing, compliance, and workflow services—FVRR needs product evidence that it captures the latter rather than simply hosting displaced freelancers.

Contrarianly, GT has the clearer identifiable catalyst path but also materially more balance-sheet sensitivity; FVRR has less refinancing risk but lacks proof that its revenue base has bottomed. Consensus may underappreciate the value of FVRR’s liquidity only if management can maintain positive free cash flow after restructuring, while bulls may overstate GT’s EV exposure because faster tire wear does not automatically translate into superior pricing or mix in a competitive replacement market.

Key Decisions for Investors

• Watch, do not initiate GT until the next earnings release confirms sequential replacement-tire margin improvement and reiterates net-debt reduction. If validated, establish a 3-6 month long GT position with a 15-20% upside target; exit on a guidance cut, negative free cash flow, or evidence of renewed import-driven pricing pressure.
• Express a cleaner cyclical-recovery view through a pair: long GT / short XLY or a broad consumer-discretionary proxy over 3-6 months, sized small given GT-specific leverage. The thesis is self-help plus replacement demand versus discretionary demand sensitivity; invalidate if GT’s volume/mix deteriorates despite stable auto miles driven.
• Keep FVRR on an earnings-alert list rather than buying solely on cash-adjusted valuation. Initiate only after two quarters showing stabilization in active buyers or GMV alongside maintained free-cash-flow positivity; target a 6-12 month rerating, with a hard review if high-value-project growth decelerates below buyer-base contraction.
• For higher-risk optionality, use a defined-risk FVRR call spread 6-9 months out only after the buyer/GMV stabilization signal. Avoid naked equity size before disclosure of cash burn inclusive of restructuring, acquisitions, and stock-based compensation; the key falsifier is a return to material cash consumption.