Women astronauts outnumber men in NASA’s new class—they’re now halfway through training and set to earn around $150K with no overtime or hazard pay

Six of the 10 candidates in NASA’s newest astronaut class are women, a first for the agency’s class selection; the group is just past halfway through its two-year training. Qualified NASA astronauts earn about $152,000 annually, based on 2024 figures, without overtime or hazard pay. The article also notes that astronauts Williams and Wilmore received about $1,430 each in extra incidentals after their mission extended from eight days to 286 days.

Analysis

The only investable read-through to Boeing (BA) is reputational, not financial: the Starliner stranding is used as a vivid example of mission risk and weak astronaut compensation, but the article supplies no new technical finding, contract penalty, remediation cost, or schedule update. The astronaut pay figure itself is immaterial to BA; NASA workforce compensation should not be conflated with contractor economics.

Near term, this is unlikely to change BA cash flows or valuation on its own. Over 1–3 months, the relevant catalysts are independently verifiable Starliner test results, NASA mission assignments, schedule revisions, and any change in contract scope or accountability. Over 6–18 months, repeated delays could make NASA more reliant on alternatives such as SpaceX and Blue Origin, weakening BA’s position in crew transportation and further raising execution-risk concerns. That is a conditional risk, not an outcome established by this article.

Contrarian point: the story’s dramatic stranded-astronaut anecdote may reinforce negative sentiment toward BA without adding incremental evidence about liability or program economics. A direct short on this article is not justified; broader NASA astronaut hiring and pay are not a proxy for commercial launch demand or contractor margins.

Key Decisions for Investors

• No trade on the article alone. Treat its BA reference as a sentiment reminder rather than a new fundamental catalyst.
• For existing BA exposure, monitor NASA decisions and independently confirmed Starliner test and schedule milestones; reassess if these imply additional scope, delay, or accountability consequences.
• Consider a relative-value short of BA versus aerospace peers only if fresh evidence shows persistent Starliner slippage or a material NASA program impact. Falsifiers: successful milestones on schedule and no adverse change in mission assignments or contract scope.