D-Wave Quantum Crashed in 2026: One Wall Street Pro Predicts 170% Returns by 2027

D-Wave Quantum’s second-quarter revenue of $3.08 million missed consensus by 23.63%, adjusted EBITDA loss widened 85% to $37.1 million, and the shares are down 39.62% year to date. Rosenblatt reiterated Buy with a Street-high $43 target, about 172% above the stated $15.79 share price, citing $35.5 million in first-half bookings and a 668% increase in remaining performance obligations to $40.7 million. The outlook hinges on two annealing-system deliveries expected in Q4 and conversion of backlog into revenue; management expects Q3 revenue to be up modestly and Q4 revenue up significantly.

Analysis

The key risk is not simply a quarterly miss; it is whether commercial traction converts into repeatable, high-quality revenue. Bookings and RPO can support the bull case, but hardware delivery and customer acceptance may make reported revenue lumpy, while a shipped system does not by itself prove recurring Leap usage or attractive unit economics. A strong Q4 could therefore trigger a sharp sentiment rebound without resolving the longer-term monetization question.

The near-term setup is asymmetric: overwhelmingly positive analyst ratings leave little visible skepticism in target-based narratives, while the revenue base is too small for trailing sales multiples to anchor value reliably. Conversely, the remaining cash provides time to execute, so dilution is a risk to monitor rather than an immediate certainty. The acquisition-driven increase in shares makes future funding terms and cash burn especially relevant.

Over 1–3 months, delivery timing, revenue recognition, and customer expansion are the decisive catalysts. Over 6–18 months, the thesis depends on production customers becoming repeat users and recurring cloud revenue growing enough to offset ongoing development costs. Gate-model capability is a long-duration option, not a near-term earnings driver. Broader quantum-sector weakness could persist even if D-Wave executes; a D-Wave-specific rebound would be more credible if it outperforms peers on conversion evidence. AT&T exposure is not a material read-through without contract economics; do not infer a meaningful earnings effect for T from a customer relationship alone.

Key Decisions for Investors

• Keep QBTS small or underweight as an event-driven position rather than treating analyst targets as a valuation floor. Reassess after Q4: confirm both system deliveries, revenue recognition, and whether customer usage or expansions accompany the hardware sales.
• Do not initiate a peer pair solely on year-to-date performance. If Q4 delivery slips or cash use remains elevated without revenue conversion, consider a defined-risk bearish position in QBTS; first check option liquidity, implied volatility, and borrow costs, which are not provided.
• Track RPO conversion, recurring cloud revenue, quarterly operating cash burn, and fully diluted share count. A rising RPO balance without timely revenue conversion—or renewed equity issuance—would falsify the near-term recovery thesis.
• Treat a strong Q4 print as a catalyst, not structural proof: require follow-through in recurring revenue and production-customer expansion over subsequent quarters before upgrading the long-term case. No direct trade in T is warranted from the customer link alone.