Is the Dollar Losing Its Luster?

The key market implication is not a disorderly dollar break, but a slow repricing of the dollar premium embedded across U.S. assets. As reserve managers, sovereign wealth funds, and corporates diversify marginally away from USD settlement, the first-order impact is usually benign; the second-order effect is higher term premia for Treasuries and a lower willingness to finance large U.S. deficits at current real yields. That matters most when the U.S. is already running a large gross funding requirement: even a modest shift in foreign official demand can force domestic buyers to absorb more duration, steepening the curve and making fiscal slippage self-reinforcing.

The relative winners are currencies and financial centers that can intermediate trade and savings without forcing a binary shift away from the dollar. That favors the euro, yen, Swiss franc, and selective EMs with cleaner external balances, but also commodity exporters that can invoice more flexibly as the trade system becomes more multipolar. The losers are long-duration U.S. assets whose valuation assumes persistent reserve-currency privilege: front-end policy may stay restrictive longer if the currency weakens, while the back end is vulnerable to a term-premium regime change even without an outright inflation shock.

The market is likely underpricing the speed at which geopolitics can translate into payment-system fragmentation. The catalyst isn’t a single country abandoning USD; it’s a series of bilateral workarounds, sanctions avoidance flows, and central bank reserve shifts that reduce the dollar’s network effect at the margin over 12-36 months. A real reversal would require either a credible U.S. fiscal consolidation path or a renewed global risk episode that reasserts dollar scarcity and pushes capital back into Treasuries and cash.

The contrarian point is that de-dollarization is probably overstated in headlines but understated in marginal pricing. The dollar can remain dominant while still losing share in trade invoicing and reserves, and that gradual erosion is enough to matter for asset allocation. In practice, this is less a “short USD” trade than a “buy volatility in rates and FX dispersion” regime, because the transition is slow but nonlinear once market participants start front-running reserve diversification.