What are all the sanctions Iran is under?

Iran faces overlapping UN, US, EU and UK sanctions covering oil and gas exports, banking, shipping, aviation, metals, arms, nuclear activity and ballistic missiles. UN sanctions were reimposed in September 2025 through the UNSC Resolution 2231 snapback mechanism, restoring six prior resolutions and restrictions on arms transfers, uranium enrichment, missile-related activity, assets and trade. The US also introduced new sanctions this month, including secondary-sanctions risks for foreign firms operating across energy, finance, technology, digital assets, gold, aviation and shipping, intensifying Iran's isolation from global financial markets.

Analysis

The investable variable is enforcement intensity rather than the legal architecture. A credible tightening of shipping, insurance and payment-channel enforcement can remove marginal Iranian barrels faster than physical production changes, lifting prompt crude spreads and medium-sour differentials before headline Brent fully responds. The first-order beneficiaries are XLE/XOP and sanctioned-barrel-compliant tanker operators; the less obvious losers are Asian independent refiners reliant on discounted feedstock and trade-finance intermediaries exposed to secondary-sanctions screening costs.

Near term, the oil response should be judged through observable friction: Iranian floating storage, AIS-dark fleet activity, China’s independent-refinery crude intake, Dubai/Oman prompt spreads and VLCC/Suezmax rates. Without a sustained decline in delivered volumes, this is largely a risk-premium event and not sufficient to underwrite higher 2027 energy earnings. A de-escalation, selective enforcement waivers, or greater Chinese absorption of discounted cargoes would compress the geopolitical premium quickly; conversely, disruption to transit or insurance availability creates a nonlinear upside tail for crude and freight within days.

Consensus may overstate the direct supply shock while underestimating the cost of compliance across commodities and shipping. Broad restrictions can fragment tanker availability even when barrels continue moving, supporting charter rates and widening regional crude dislocations. Over 6-18 months, persistent isolation favors low-cost non-OPEC supply and LNG exporters, but high oil prices also accelerate demand destruction and invite policy releases or diplomatic supply offsets, limiting the durability of a simple long-oil thesis.

Key Decisions for Investors

• Use a 1-3 month long XLE / short JETS pair only if Brent backwardation and Dubai prompt spreads both widen for five consecutive sessions; energy captures the input-price upside while airline fuel costs reset with a lag. Exit if Brent falls below its pre-escalation range or crack spreads contract materially.
• Buy 2-3 month upside calls on USO rather than outright futures for the transit-disruption tail; target a 2:1 minimum payoff-to-premium profile and size as event risk. Do not initiate solely on sanctions headlines absent evidence of reduced delivered Iranian volumes.
• Watch-list long FRO or STNG on confirmed sanctions-driven vessel scarcity, evidenced by sustained VLCC/Suezmax spot-rate acceleration and higher compliant-fleet utilization. The key falsifier is rising tanker rates caused by temporary congestion while global crude loadings and ton-mile demand remain flat.
• Prefer selective long LNG exporters such as LNG over broad European industrial exposure if regional gas-risk premia expand; reassess within 1-3 months because policy intervention and demand curtailment can reverse the spread faster than contracted LNG cash flows change.